AV¶ÌÊÓƵ

The Transnational Diffusion of Anti-Corruption Activism and Anti-Corruption Technologies: Trajectories, Challenges and Implications in the I Paid a Bribe case

13/01/2025 15:15-17:00, Room: M2020 Uni Mail and online (zoom). To participate via zoom, please register by sending an email to margins-corruption(at)unige.ch

Abstract

This talk, based on a work in progress in collaboration with Alessandra Lo Piccolo, postdoc at the AV¶ÌÊÓƵ of Bologna, and linked to the ERC research project BIT-ACT, explores the challenges of transnational diffusion of anti-corruption initiatives.

The Indian NGO Janaagraha's crowdsourced anti-corruption website I Paid a Bribe (IPAB), launched in 2010, has received considerable international attention as a successful grassroots innovation in tackling bribery, a specific form of petty corruption. Despite its initial success and widespread acclaim, attempts to replicate IPAB in other countries mostly did not happened, with many initiatives fading quickly after their inception.

Why does this happen, and what does it reveal about the complexities of transferring grassroots anti-corruption innovations across borders? What constitute success or failure, in the framework of the transnational diffusion of anti-corruption technologies? Drawing on qualitative research that includes in-depth interviews with activists and a practice-theoretical lens, this talk identifies four key practices—ideating, designing, translating, and maintaining—that shape the diffusion trajectories of IPAB. These practices highlight the intricate interplay of material, social, and symbolic elements that influence the success or failure of transnational replication efforts.

The talk demonstrates that challenges to transnational diffusion stem not only from technical or organizational hurdles but also from the misalignment of socio-political contexts and cultural expectations. In doing so, it contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the obstacles that impede the successful translation of grassroots anti-corruption technologies across borders and underscores the importance of context-sensitive approaches, emphasizing the need to adapt grassroots technologies to the unique environments in which they are implemented.

Waiting for a Messiah: Accountability Deficits and Institutional Dysfunctions in Hungary

16/12/2024 12:15-13:15, Room: M4276 Uni Mail and online (zoom)

Abstract

The corruption of institutional actions continues to be a major concern across various political settings. As a pathology of public institutions, it has been studied by political theorists through conceptual and normative frameworks fitting to democratic orders. This research inquiries if those analytical tools are also applicable for analysing political corruption in hybrid regimes. For this purpose, 28 semi-structured interviews with elected and non-elected officeholders were conducted in Hungary between 2-22^nd April, 2024. The research provides evidence in interpreting the corruption of public institutions in hybrid settings as sharing the same conceptual and normative core as the corruption of public institutions in democratic settings. It also gives certain insights on differences and similarities of political corruption in democratic settings and hybrid regimes. In our hypotheses we argued that hybrid regimes have large-scale accountability deficits causing institutional dysfunctions, which are the legacy of the past, furthermore officeholders and society accept and condone accountability deficits and institutional dysfunctions. The study has found rich and critical findings pertaining to the research question and hypotheses. They reveal the way in which 28 Hungarian officeholders understand accountability practices and institutional dysfunctions, the reasons and consequences of accountability deficits and institutional dysfunctions, and society's and officeholders' reactions vis-à-vis those two phenomena.

Dirty Rules Dilemmas: How to Justly Engage with Corrupt Politics

23/10/2024, 14:15-16:00, Online seminar (zoom).

To participate via zoom, please register by sending an email to margins-corruption(at)unige.ch

Abstract

“Dirty hands” theory posits that sometimes political actors are justified in doing wrong to do right: that an all-things-considered justifiable course of action is nonetheless accompanied by a real and tangible moral remainder. Usually such discussions have focused on this dirt either arising in the context of an episodic choice or as a ubiquitous and quotidian aspect of political life. While both of these approaches have their place, I argue that they leave an important part of our political reality neglected. I term these “dirty rules” dilemmas, where the political climate or terms of the competition mean that morally dirtying behaviour is required in the pursuit of political goals. Examples include redistricting systems that incentivise gerrymandering, campaign finance systems that require corrupt dealing, instances where the ‘Overton window’ focuses on morally lacking positions, and polarised political climates that legitimise more aggressive tactics. These are contingent and remediable aspects of politics, but political actors must engage with them as they currently exist, including in order to change them.

The Human Factor in Anti-Corruption – A research agenda for the missing link between policy design and effective implementation

27/05/2024, 16:15-18:00, Room M4020 Uni Mail and online 

To participate via zoom, please register by sending an email to margins-corruption(at)unige.ch

Abstract

Administrative corruption is one of the most pressing unresolved issues of our time, and anti-corruption efforts are notoriously ineffective. Based on a novel behavioral approach to understanding administrative corruption, K.S. Weissmüller discusses five major challenges that result in the anti-corruption policy-implementation gap and proposes solutions to make public sector anti-corruption strategies more effective.

Does democracy reduce corruption? The role of women’s representation

4/03/2024, 16:15-18:00, Room M3389 Uni Mail and online 

To participate via zoom, please register by sending an email to margins-corruption(at)unige.ch

Abstract

Why do some democracies struggle with rampant corruption while others seem to contain it more successfully? While the corruption-reducing effect of democracy may be seemingly self-evident in light of the theoretical expectations, a wealth of empirical literature suggests that democracies are not always as effective as theories would predict. This seminar will discuss the conditions under which demcracy reduces corruption, with a particular focus on the role of women’s representation. In the last two decades, studies have found a strong association between the share of women in elected office and lower levels of corruption. While equal opportunities and women’s rights are firmly rooted in human rights norms and declarations, the interest in women’s representation has gained substantial leverage from the notion that women representation could also change politics for the better. International organizations, aid agencies and governments promote women representation as a cure for mismanagement, corruption, and public service delivery failures. This has sparked an intense debate about how the share of women in politics is linked to lower levels of corruption and how and when women are recruited into office. In this seminar, I will present our recent work on the link between democratic representation, accountability, and different forms of corruption as well as a newer vignette experiment on recruitment procedures, gender and perceived legitimacy. 

Pervasive Institutions: How Correlation Creates Injustice

11/12/2023, 16:00-17:45 Room 5389 UniMail and online.

To participate via zoom, please register by sending an email to margins-corruption(at)unige.ch

Abstract

In this seminar I will identify and discuss an institutional mechanism that is arguably a common source of injustice: the tendency of (some) institutions to regulate multiple behavioural domains at once, using a single set of correlation devices. I will first introduce the “rules-in-equilibrium” account of institutions, highlighting the central role played by technological artefacts (traffic lights), artificial tags (uniforms, certificates), and natural properties (race, gender) in the solution of coordination problems. I will then argue that  some devices tend to reach beyond their intended domain, generating outcomes that are systematically biased against some members of the population. Some examples - family, gender, markets, armies — will back up the theoretical discussion with concrete cases. 

Unjust shadows: living with the burden of distrust

27/11/2023 12:15-13:45, Room: M4276 UniMail and Online (co-hosted by the GECOPOL)