Une r茅cente 茅tude souligne les avantages d'un poste de 芦 Executive Board Chair 禄 dans les entreprises
L'茅tude, actuellement sous presse au Journal of Management, montre que la cr茅ation d鈥檜n poste de 芦 Executive Board Chair听禄 g茅n猫re de la performance en offrant un compromis qui assure autant la surveillance ind茅pendante que l鈥檌mplication dans la strat茅gie. Cette 茅tude a 茅t茅 men茅e par Dr. Robert Langan, ancien collaborateur scientifique 脿 la GSEM, Ryan Krause, professeur 脿 la Texas Christian AV短视频 et Markus Menz, professeur et doyen de la GSEM. Ces travaux ont b茅n茅fici茅 du soutien du Fonds national Suisse.
ABSTRACT [en anglais] :
Traditional agency theory views the proper role of the board chair exclusively as providing independent oversight to monitor and control the CEO. Recently, firms have introduced innovations in board leadership that have confounded these theoretical expectations. One notable innovation is the executive board chair, a corporate governance hybrid responsible for both oversight and strategic decision-making, challenging agency theory's prescription that the two activities remain separate. In this study, we argue that an executive board chair position can resolve the trade-off between independent oversight and involvement in strategy and therefore generate a performance advantage. We also predict that, owing to the blurring of lines between the CEO and board chair roles that the executive board chair position creates, the relationship will be stronger the greater the need to monitor and control the CEO but weaker when organizational complexity and board leadership demands are greater. Analysis of S&P 1500 firms from 2003 to 2017 provides general support for our arguments.
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22 ao没t 20222022
